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(4)

(5)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DETERMINING THAT AN AGISTMENT BAILMENT
RELATIONSHIP CANNOT BE CREATED IN THE
ABSENCE OF THE PUTATIVE BAILEE'S
EXPRESS AGREEMENT TO EXERCISE CARE.

B.

WHETHER THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE
OF UTAH CONCERNING THE WELL-BEING OF
ANIMALS IS IMPERMISSIBLY CONTROVERTED
BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.

REFERENCE TO REPORT OF COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The Court of Appeals' opinion in this case appears at
P.2d

, 84 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Utah App. 1988); the

Court of Appeals Docket Number is 880073-CA.
(6)

JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS
(a)

The decision sought to be reviewed was entered

June 10, 1988.
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(b)

No rehearing was sought below, and no extension

of time has been sought within which to petition for certiorari
(c)

This is an original petition and not a cross-

(d)

The statutory provisions believed to confer on

petition,

this Court jurisdiction to review the decision in question by
a writ of certiorari are Utah Code Ann, §§78-2-2(3)(a) and
78-2-2(5).
•

(6)

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
(a)

This case involves, among other things, the Utah

Agistor's Lien Statute,

It is codified as Utah Code Ann,

§38-2-1 and provides, and has, at all times material hereto,
provided:
Every ranchman, farmer, agistor, herder of
cattle, tavern keeper or livery stable keeper
to whom any domestic animals shall be entrusted
for the purpose of feeding, herding or pasturing
shall have a lien upon such animals for the
amount that may be due him for such feeding,
herding or pasturing and is authorized to
retain possession of such animals until such
amount is paid.
(Emphasis added.)
(b)
Statute.

*

This case also involves the Utah Animal Cruelty

It is codified at Utah Code Ann. §76-9-301 and pro-

vides, and has, at all times material hereto, provided, in
pertinent part:
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-A-

(1)

A person commits cruelty to animals if
he intentionally or knowingly . . .
(b)

Fails to provide necessary food,
care, or shelter for an animal in
his custody; or

(c)

Abandons an animal in his custody
. . .

(Emphasis added.)

(8)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Alfred T. Smurthwaite, plaintiff-appellant, petitions

for issuance of a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals.
This is an action for damages brought by Mr. Smurthwaite
against John Painter, defendant-respondent, in which Mr. Smurthwaite
seeks to recover substantial monetary damages for the death of
ten of his Appaloosa race-bred broodmares during the winter of
1983-84.
In the proceedings in the Second District Court (Davis
County —

Honorable Rodney S. Page), Mr. Smurthwaite pursued

his claims against Mr. Painter, through trial, on two alternative theories:

simple breach of contract (the trial court

rejected Mr. Smurthwaite1s testimony that the oral agreement
expressly required Mr. Painter to keep his eyes on the horses
and let him know if they were in trouble) and breach of an
agistment bailment agreement.

The District Court found that

the agreement was for pasturage only and ruled against
Mr. Smurthwaite and in favor of Mr. Painter, no cause of
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action, on both theories, Mr. Smurthwaite, recognizing that
the District Court's straight contract-law decision was not
"clearly erroneous," appealed only on the agistment bailment
question.

The Court of Appeals (Judges Davidson, Jackson and

Garff) affirmed.
Mr. Smurthwaite respectfully submits that the following
is a statement of undisputed facts material to the disposition
of this Petition:
1.

At all times material hereto, defendant-respondent

John Painter owned, held as lessee under one or more lease
agreements, or otherwise controlled certain land 350-390 acres
in size located near 1700 South State near the Great Salt Lake
in or near Syracuse in Davis County, State of Utah.
95.

Record at

Ct. of App. Op. at 1.
2.

At all times material hereto, Mr. Painter, who

has lived virtually his entire life in the immediate vicinity
of the subject land, lived in a house adjacent to the subject
land, and Mr. Smurthwaite lived in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, approximately 35 miles from the subject land.

Record at

96; Tr., Vol. II, at 27.
3.

In the fall of 1981, Mr. Smurthwaite, an experi-

enced owner-breeder of Appaloosa horses, and Mr. Painter
entered into an oral agreement, automatically renewable on a
month-to-month basis, concerning Mr. Smurthwaite's pasturing
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of his horses on the subject land.

Record at 95. Ct. of App.

Op. at 1, 2.
4.

According to the terms of the said agreement,

Mr. Smurthwaite was to pay to Mr. Painter $15.00 per head per
month for each horse that Mr. Smurthwaite placed or caused to
be placed on the subject land.

Record at 95.

Ct. of App. at

1.
5.

In or about the fall of 1981 and from time to

time thereafter, Mr. Smurthwaite, pursuant to the said agreement, placed and caused to be placed Appaloosa horses on the
subject land, and, through at least December 5, 1983, all such
horses were in good flesh and not nearing starvation.

Record

at 95; Tr., Vol. II, at 37, 56, 135.
6.

At some time subsequent to the commencement of

the said month-to-month relationship with Mr. Smurthwaite,
Mr. Painter entered into an agreement with one Robert Child,
according to the terms of which Mr. Child obtained the right
to pasture his horses on part of the subject land.

Record at

96.
7.

Mr. Painter was aware and Mr. Smurthwaite testi-

fied that he, Mr. Smurthwaite, was not aware, throughout at
least late December 1983, and January 1984, and until the dead
horses were found, in early February 1984, of the uncontested
facts:

(a) that Mr. Child's horses were, during that period,

located on a portion of the subject land ("the upper pasture")

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

visible from the road (1700 South Street) adjacent to which
Mr. Painter's house was located; and (b) that Mr. Smurthwaite's
broodmares were located on a portion of the subject land that
was not visible from the said road ("the lower pasture").
E.g., Tr., Vol. II, at 270; Vol. Ill, at 5, 68-69.
8.

At all times material hereto, the upper pasture

contained and the lower pasture did not contain much of a
grass known as "crested wheat grass," which grew tall enough
to provide pasturage in inordinately severe winters.

E.g.,

Tr., Vol. II, at 219.
9.
winter.

The winter of 1983-84 was an inordinately severe

Record at 131.
10.

Mr. Painter had heard, prior to Mr. Smurthwaite's

discovery of the dead horses, that other animals were starving
to death in the vicinity of Mr. Painter's property and that
the Humane Society was investigating.
11.

Tr., Vol. II, at 266-67.

Mr. Smurthwaite did not set foot on the subject

property from on or about December 5, 1983 until February 7 or 8,
1984.

Record at 131. Ct. of App. Op. at 3.
12.

Mr. Smurthwaite testified that he though that

Mr. Painter would let him know if the horses needed supplemental food in addition to that provided by the pasturage
naturally available.

E.g., Tr., Vol. II, at 30, 31, 35; Vol.

Ill, at 68-69.
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13.

Mr. Smurthwaite paid Mr. Painter, pursuant to the

subject agreement, sums of money, totaling in excess of
$5,200.00.

Tr., Vol. Ill, at 69.

14.

Mr. Smurthwaite was in arrears on his agreed-upon

monthly payments during the months of December 1983 and January
and February 1984. E.g., Tr., Vol. II, at 56-58, 244-45, 268;
Exhibits L, M, N.
15.

On a date or dates in late December 1983, January

1984 and/or February 1984, ten of Mr. Smurthwaite*s Appaloosa
broodmares died of starvation in the lower pasture.

Record at

95.
16.
1983-84.

All of Mr. Child's horses survived the winter of

Tr., Vol. II, at 271.
17.

Ct. of App. Op. at 3.

After Mr. Smurthwaite's horses were known to be

dead, Mr. Painter informed Mr. Smurthwaite that Mr. Painter
would retain custody of Mr. Smurthwaite1s surviving horses
(also located on the subject land) until Mr. Smurthwaite
became current on his payments.
18.

Tr., Vol. II, at 250.

At the non-jury trial, held on May 21, 22 and

28, 1986, Mr. Smurthwaite put on expert testimony of damages
in the approximate principal amount of $94,000.00 for the loss
of his broodmares and their unborn foals.

Tr., Vol. I, at

57-80; Exhibit X.
19.

At trial, Mr. Painter put on testimony to show

that the damages, if any, suffered by Mr. Smurthwaite were in
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the approximate principal amount of $9,000.00.

Tr., Vol. Ill,

at 38.

(9)

ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT
The two questions presented are interrelated.

Mr. Smurthwaite contends that the trial court and the Court of
Appeals panel both erred in determining, as a matter of law,
that a landowner who receives pasturage monies from an owner
of livestock has no duty of care toward the stock or its owner
unless he, the landowner, expressly agrees to exercise such
care.

Mr. Smurthwaite1s view is that, as a matter of law, a

pasturage-for-pay agreement (whether month-to-month (as here)
or for another period of time) constitutes an agistment bailment
agreement, and that, as such, like other bailments, it carries
with it a duty of care.
He bases his contention on:

(1) this Court's decision

in Hughes v. Yardley, 19 Utah 2d 166, 428 P.2d 158, 159 (1969)
(not cited by the trial court or the Court of Appeals and not
overruled or undermined by Baker v. Hansen, 666 P.2d 315 (Utah
1983)), in which this Court appears to have recognized that a
"pasturage-only" agreement constitutes an agistment bailment;
(2) the clear weight of authority from other jurisdictions
(see, e.g., Cox v. Chase, 163 Pac. 184 (Kan. 1917), Cox v.
Pithoud, 221 Cal. App. 2d 571, 34 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1963);
Vaughan v. Bixby, 142 Pac. 100 (Cal. App. 1914); and Ward v.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Newell, 315 S.E.2d 721 (N.C. App. 1984), holding that purely
pasturage relationships —
of care by the bailee —

without an expressly undertaken duty

constitute agistment bailments;

(3) Utah Code Ann. §38-2-1 (the agistor's lien statute), which
includes purely pasturage relationships in its universe of
relationships entitling the landowner to a lien and to retain
animals (i.e., to exercise some manner of "custody" over them)
pastured on his land until pasturage fees are paid to him; and
Utah Code Ann. §76-9-301 (the Animal Cruelty statute) which
establishes the criminal liability of a landowner who has
"custody" of animals and who knowingly does not adequately
care for them or "abandons" them.
Mr. Smurthwaite respectfully suggests that it would
be appropriate for this Court to grant the requested writ and
fully examine the factual background of this case and the legal
framework that governs it.

It appears that the Court of Appeals

decision is at odds with what this Court took for granted in
Hughes v. Yardley; it appears that the Court of Appeals paid
no heed to the agistor's lien statute (which was relied on,
knowingly or unknowingly, by Mr. Painter when he refused to
release the surviving horses until Mr. Smurthwaite made payment
in the spring of 1984, and which statute, Mr. Smurthwaite contends , automatically vested Mr. Painter with legal "custody"
of the horses that died during the time they were dying, inasmuch
as Mr. Smurthwaite was then in arrears on his pasturage payments);
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and it appears that the Court of Appeals also paid utterly no
heed to Mr. Smurthwaite1s public policy argument concerning
the Animal Cruelty Statute.
It appeared to Mr. Smurthwaite, at the time of trial,
at the time of briefing (the trial court's ruling was originally appealed to this Court and referred for decision to the
Court of Appeals), at the time of oral argument, and it regrettably still appears (if the Court of Appeals decision is allowed
to stand) that, if Mr. Painter had no duty to inform Mr. Smurthwaite that his horses were, in all likelihood, starving to
death, a Utah landowner who is owed pasturage money by a
livestock owner and who has the statutory right to exercise
"custody" over the stock can, with impunity, watch that stock
suffer and die and never alert the owner of the stock to what
is happening.

That, Mr. Smurthwaite contends, ought not to be

the law of the State.

That consideration is perhaps why other

jurisdictions (and this Court in Yardley) have recognized a
bailment relationship to exist in Mpasturage-onlyM agreements.
And the import of the Court of Appeals decision ought to be
fully examined by this Court.

j

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

//

day of July, 1988.

WINDER & HASLAM, P.C,

BY.
Peter C. Collins
Attorneys for AppellantPetitioner
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OPINION
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOoo
Alfred T. Smurthwaite/
Plaintiff and Appellant/

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
John Painter/

Case No. 880073-CA

Defendant and Respondent.
Before Judges Davidson/ Jackson and Garff

DAVIDSON/ Judge:

FILED
Tirnitny U\. Shea
™ of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals

Plaintiff Alfred Smurthwaite appeals the district court's
judgment in favor of defendant John Painter dismissing
Smurthwaite1s complaint for no cause of action. Plaintiff
relies on two theories: breach of contract and breach of an
agistment bailment agreement/ both arising from the death of
ten of Smurthwaite's broodmares. We affirm.
At all times material hereto. Painter owned/ leased, or
otherwise controlled 390 acres (hereinafter, -the subject
landM)/ located in Davis County, Utah. The subject land is
divided into one 40.acre parcel with approximately 10 acres of
pasture referred to as the -upper pasture- and a second 350
acre pasture referred to as the "lower pasture.- The two
parcels are divided by a large drainage ditch, running roughly
east and west. The lower pasture has good grass and water, but
does not contain as much crested wheat grass which grows tall
enough to provide pasturage during winter months. While
Painter's home lies adjacent to the upper pasture, from his
home or barn the lower pasture is not visible.
In the fall of 1981/ Smurthwaite and Painter entered into
an oral agreement/ automatically renewable on a month-to-month
basis/ whereby Smurthwaite would pasture his Appaloosa horses
on Painter's property for $15 per head per month. At the end
of each month/ until November 1983/ Smurthwaite counted the
number of horses on the pasture to determine the amount owed to
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Painter.1
Smurthwaite placed horses on the upper pasture in October
1981. According to the oral agreement, Painter had no
responsibility to feed or check Smurthwaite'S horses, nor to
maintain any fences on the subject land.2 Smurthwaite had^
free access to come and go onto the property and to move his
horses in and out as necessary without any contact or
interference from Painter. The lower pasture has three means
of access: through Painter's farm, through sewer plant
property, and through the south end of the 350 acre parcel by
Miller's pond. The sewer plant access is paved and is plowed
in the winter.3
During the fall and winter of 1981-82, Smurthwaite
inspected his horses three to four times each week and twelve ,
times during the 1982-83 winter season. During the spring of
1982, Smurthwaite's horses were moved to the lower pasture.
There is dispute as to who moved the horses but Smurthwaite
made no objection. The horses remained in the lower pasture
from spring 1982 until June 1984.
In the fall of 1982, Painter entered into agreements with
others resulting in sheep, horses, and a trailer being placed
on the upper pasture. While Smurthwaite testified that he
observed the sheep on the upper pasture, he never complained to
Painter about the other livestock or his horses being on the
lower pasture.
1. Smurthwaite is an experienced horseman, having been involved
in the Appaloosa breeding business since 1967-68. Smurthwaite
is aware that a horse can starve to death in two-four weeks.
Painter is not an experienced horseman.
2. Smurthwaite's reply brief concedes that Painter had no
responsibility to feed nor inspect his horses. However, he does
contend that Painter was not excused from all care of the
horses. Smurthwaite expected Painter to exercise a modicum of
sensory concern, and when reasonably necessary, to communicate
his concerns to Smurthwaite.
3. The trial court found that Smurthwaite had used the sewer
plant access at least 6 times prior to the 1983-84 winter to
move horses in and out.

880073-CA
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(

The winter of 1983-84 was very severe, the first snow
falling in November, Sraurthwaite inspected his horses on
December 5, 1983, but did not inspect them again until February
4, 1984, and then only from the road. He testified he could not
identify them as his horses because they were too far away.
Three days later, on February 7, 1984, Smurthwaite walked onto
the lower pasture and found that ten of his Appaloosa broodmares
with unborn foals had died from starvation. All of the horses
on the upper pasture survived the 1983-84 winter.
Smurthwaite filed his complaint October 4, 1984, and a
bench trial was heard May 21, 1986. The trial court concluded:
the agreement did not apply to any particular parcel of
Painter's land; no agistment agreement had been made between the
parties; Painter did not breach the agreement; and Painter did *
not owe any duty of care for the livestock nor to inspect the
animals nor even to report their condition under the
circumstances of this case. The court concluded:
[H]owever, assuming that such a duty
existed and defendant were found to be
negligent in carrying out that duty, the
Court would conclude that plaintiff in
failing to inspect his stock from December
5, 1983, to February 7, 1984, was
negligent himself and that said negligence
was at least equal to, if not greater,
than that of defendant.
The trial court granted judgment to defendant and ordered
plaintiffs complaint dismissed for no cause of action.
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court
erred in failing to find an agistment bailment agreement. The
Utah Supreme Court defined agistment bailment in Baker v.
Hansen, 666 P.2d 315 (Utah 1983), stating:
It is well established that a contract to
care for animals for a specified term, an
agistment, is a "species of bailment," and
that under such a contract "there is
ordinarily an obligation to return or
account for the animals at the end of the
term.H
Id. at 320 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). Likewise,
the Montana Supreme Court in Heckman and Shell v. Wilson, 158
Mont. 47, 487 P.2d 1141, 1146 (1971), stated:

880073-CA
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(

The term agistment is characterized by an
agreement in which one person agrees to
care for and feed animals of another for a
consideration/ either at a named price or
for the reasonable value of the services
rendered.
See also 3A C.J.S. Animals § 46 (1973). These cases are in
accord with the law of bailment which gives, total control and
exclusive possession of property to the bailee during the
bailment period. 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 23" (±988).
The record indicates that Smurthwaite had total control
over his horses in moving them in and out of the subject land.
^Smurthwaite was responsible for the monthly accounting of
horses to determine the rents due. Further, Smurthwaite
testified that he did not expect Painter to feed or care for
his horses. During the more than two years prior to December
1983, Smurthwaite inspected, fed, and tended his horses at
least two to three times a week while Painter had nothing to do
with them. There is no showing that Painter had any duty to
look after or care for the animals of Smurthwaite.
We decline to take the position urged upon us by
Smurthwaite that any agreement for the use of pasture carries
with it a duty of care on the part of the landowner. To do so
would create a YieW species of bailment that was never intended
or contemplated by the parties. For an agistment bailment to
be established, there must be a showing of some duty of care
bargained for and accepted by the landowner. There is no such
showing in this case.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed,
;o respondent.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

WE CONCUR:

'"*\-£&<& "'-

^RegirarF"

880073-CA
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Costs are

TAYLOR D. CARR - A0582
Attorney for Defendant
350 South 400 East, Suite 114
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-0888
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECqND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALFRED T. SMURTHWAITE,
;

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

I
;

Civil No.

2-36259

JOHN PAINTER,
Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
before the above-entitled Court on May 21, 1986, and the
Court having heard the testimony of the witnesses and having
reviewed the evidence herein, and being fully advised in
the premises, hereby finds and rules as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That defendant Painter owns and leases certain pro-

perty in Davis County, State of Utah.
2.

That the land in question is divided into one 40

acre cultivated parcel with approximately 10 acres of pasture
referred to as the upper pasture and a second 350 acre parcel
consisting of pasture referred to as the lower pasture.
The parcels are separated by a large drainage ditch running
approximately east and west.
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3.

The plaintiff is an experienced horseman having

been involved in the Appaloosa breeding business since 1967-68.
4.

The plaintiff, in addition to his experience, has

taken many classes on horse care and was aware that a horse
could die in two to four weeks from Starvation.
5.

That the defendant is not an experienced horseman.

6.

That defendant resides adjacent to the upper pasture.

7.

That the lower pasture is not observable from the

barn area or the home on the upper pasture.
8.

That the plaintiff and defendant entered into an

agreement whereby it was agreed that plaintiff could pasture
his horses on defendant's property for $15.00 per head payable
at the end of each month.
9.

That the defendant had no responsibility to feed

or check the horses or even maintain fences.
10.

That plaintiff had free access to property to come

and go as warranted and to move the horses in and out as
he saw fit with no contact or interference with or from the
defendant.
11.

That the agreement was from month to month.

12.

That the horses were brought by the plaintiff and

placed on the upper pasture in October of 1981.
13.

That the horses were moved down on the lower pasture

in the Spring of 1982.
14.

That it is not clear from the evidence who moved
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them.
15.

Plaintiff made no objection to the fact that the

horses were on the lower pasture.
16.

That the lower pasture had good grass and water.

17.

That in the Fall of 1982, 300 head of yearling

sheep were placed on the upper pasture by one, Childs, and
then in November of 1982 through April of 1983, 600 to 700
head of sheep and 4 head of horses and a trailer were placed
on the property by Mr. Marriot all of which was authorized
by the defendant.
18.

That in the Fall of 1983, 120 head of sheep were

placed on the upper pasture by Mr. Childs from October until
December 24 and 7 to 10 head of horses were placed on the
same parcel from November of 1983 to April of 1984.
19.

That plaintiff testified that he inspected his

horses every day in the Fall and Winter of 1981 and 1982;
then 3 to 4 times each week.
on the north pasture.

That he observed the sheep

The same was testified to also by

plaintiff's nephew.
20.

During the Winter of 1982 and 1983 plaintiff in-

spected the horses at least 12 times over the Winter.
21.

The horses remained in the lower pasture from the

Spring of 1982 until they were taken out in June 1984 and
plaintiff at no time ever objected to their being in the
lower pasture.
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22. The winter of 1983-84 was a very severe winter.
23.

That the plaintiff at all times relevant to this

matter resided in Murray, Utah.
24.

The snow began falling in November of 1983.

25.

That plaintiff inspected th'e horses on December

5, 1983, in the lower pasture and never inspected the horses
again until February 4, 1984 and then only from the road
where he could not identify his horses as they were too far
away.
26.

That plaintiff finally on February 7, 1984 walked

down in the lower pasture to inspect his horses and found
several dead.
27.

Plaintiff never at any time complained to defendant

about the horses being in the lower pasture or about other
livestock being in the upper pasture.
28.

The lower pasture had three means of access; one

through the defendant's farm, one through the sewer plant
property and one on the south end on the 350 acre parcel
by Miller pond.
29.

The sewer plant access was paved and was kept plowed

in the winter.
30.

That the plaintiff had used the sewer plant access

at least six times prior to the 1983-84 winter to move the
horses in and out.
31.

That plaintiff, upon finding his dead horses, in4
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dicated to defendant that he had "goofed up" allowing the
horses to die and was about out of the horse business.
32.

That defendant was working full-time at this regular

job during the winter of 1983-84 as he had at all times previous and during that winter never weht into the fields and
never saw any of plaintiff's horses.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
From the foregoing the Court concludes that the agreement
between the parties was one for pasturage rental only. That
defendant had no responsibility to feed or care for plaintiff's
animals nor to inspect them or even repair the fences.
That the said agreement did not apply to any particular
parcel of defendant's land.
The Court concludes that the agreement between the parties
was not an agistment agreement which requires in all cases
that the person sought to be charged has some contractual
responsibility for the care of the livestock.
The Court concludes that the defendant did not breach
the agreement between the parties.
The Court further concludes that the defendant had no
duty to care for the livestock or inspect the animals nor
even to report on their condition under the circumstances
of this case.
Even, however, assuming that such a duty existed and
defendant were found to be negligent in carrying out that
5
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duty, the Court would conclude that plaintiff in failing
to inspect his stock from December 5, 1983, to February 7,
1984, was negligent himself and that said negligence was
at least equal to, if not greater, than that of the defendant.
From the foregoing the Court concludes that judgment
should be granted to the defendant and plaintiff's complaint
should be dismissed for no cause of action,
DATED this

/0

>/4/

day of

, 1986.

BY THE COURT:

/*'

RODNEY S. PAGE
District Court Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, postage prepaid this

Q-5

day ot f \ M/T\X

1986, to:
Peter Collins
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

'hkAsJUJ
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TAYLOR D. CARR - A0582
Attorney for Defendant
350 South 400 East, Suite 114
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-0888
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALFRED T. SMURTHWAITE,

'.

J U D G M E N T
Plaintiff,

I

vs.

I
[

Civil No.

2-36259

JOHN PAINTER,
Defendant.
The above entitled matter having been duly tried, on
May 21, 22 and 28, 1986, without jury, the Honorable Rodney
S. Page, District Court Judge, presiding, the parties having
been represented by their respective counsel, Peter C. Collins
for plaintiff, and Taylor D. Carr for defendant, and the
court having heard the testimony of witnesses and having
reviewed the evidence presented, and upon due consideration,
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that JUDGMENT is entered in favor
of defendant and against plaintiff and plaintiff's complaint
is hereby dismissed for no cause of action with prejudice,
and upon the merits.
DATED this

fO

day of

J+Ly

, 1986.

BY THE COURT:
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing JUDGMENT, postage prepaid this
'X&

day of i JrzszU .

, 1986, to:

Peter Collins
'
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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